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Hiroshi Motomura *
Haitian Asylum Seekers: Interdiction
and Immigrants' Rights**
The basic issue in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,1 now pending
before the United States Supreme Court, is the legality of the current
United States policy of interdicting and returning all Haitians who leave
their nation by boat, without determining who might be fleeing persecu-
tion. The Bush Administration adopted this policy in May 1992 in what
has come to be called the "Kennebunkport Order,' 2 and the Clinton
Administration has continued to enforce it.3 My purpose here is not to
argue the merits of Haitian Centers Council, but rather to offer a way of
placing the interdiction phenomenon into a broader historical context.
Doing so is not just an idle academic exercise; understanding the con-
text provides a useful framework for both analysis and argument when-
ever interdiction is at issue.
"Context" can take many forms. For example, David Martin's con-
tribution to this Symposium places interdiction into an international his-
torical context. He writes persuasively that asylum countries have more
and more frequently responded to the growing demand for refuge by
adopting measures to deter new arrivals. The ultimate deterrent is, of
course, interdiction.4 Professor Martin's article shows how interdiction
and intervention can be viewed as alternatives. 5 I will attempt to place
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. This is an expanded
version of remarks presented at the Conference on Refusing Refugees: Political and
Legal Barriers to Asylum, at the Cornell Law School, February 20, 1993. I would like
to thank Linda Bosniak, Dan Kowalski, Ari Weitzhandler, and Steve Yale-Loehr for
very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
** The final version of this Article was submitted to the Cornell International Law
Journal in May 1993. As this issue went to print, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
1. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
2. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
3. See Clinton to Continue Haitian Forced Return Policy for Now, 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 85, 85-87 (1993).
4. David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFU-
GEE LAW IN THE 1980s 6 (David A. Martin ed., 1986).
5. David A. Martin, Intervention v. Interdiction: Alternative Futures, 26 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 753 (1993).
26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 695 (1993)
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interdiction into a different sort of historical context-that of United
States law governing immigration, and in particular the context of evolv-
ing judicial review in immigration cases.6
Part I of this article explains the gradual erosion of the plenary
power doctrine, which historically placed strict limits on judicial review
of the government's immigration decisions. Part II analyzes the govern-
ment's arguments in Haitian Centers Council regarding interdiction and
suggests that they represent an attempt to restore much of the immunity
that the plenary power doctrine originally provided. Part III discusses
doctrinal support for treating interdicted Haitians as having reached the
functional equivalent of the United States border for purposes of decid-
ing whether they may be returned to Haiti. Finally, Part IV suggests that
the government's reliance on interdiction contains a paradox. On the
one hand, interdiction represents an attempt by the government to
enhance its immunity from judicial review. At the same time, however,
interdiction undercuts the government's position by strengthening the
Haitians' claim that courts can protect them from forcible repatriation
without ordering their entry into the United States.
I. The Evolution of Immigration Law
A. Classical Immigration Law and the Plenary Power Doctrine
Any discussion ofjudicial review in immigration cases must begin with
the Chinese Exclusion Case,7 which the United States Supreme Court
decided in 1889. That case marks the beginning of the plenary power
doctrine, which in its purest form severely limits (and often completely
forecloses) judicial consideration of constitutional challenges to immi-
gration decisions by the political branches.
In 1882, Congress responded to a wave of West Coast xenophobia
by suspending immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years.8 At first,
the law provided that Chinese laborers who had been in the United
States as of November 1880 could obtain certificates to prove that fact
and then use those certificates to secure reentry to the United States
6. For purposes of this article, I define immigration cases as those regarding the
admission and expulsion of aliens. As explained in Part I-C infra, the term "immigra-
tion law" is intended to exclude other contexts in which questions arise regarding the
rights of aliens, for example, to government employment, welfare benefits, or public
education. This definition of "immigration law" is common to the literature. See,
e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255, 256.
7. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For more extensive
discussions of these seminal plenary power cases, see Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1632-41 (1992) [hereinafter Procedural Surrogates]; and Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 550-54 (1990) [hereinafter Phantom
Norms].
8. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58-61, amended by Act ofJuly 5, 1884,
ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115-16 (repealed 1943).
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after a temporary visit overseas. The Chinese Exclusion Case concerned the
exclusion of one such laborer, Chae Chan Ping, who had left on a visit to
China. During his absence, Congress amended the law to bar the return
of Chinese laborers to the United States, including those who possessed
a certificate. Emphasizing the nation's sovereignty over its territory, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. According to
Justice Field's opinion for a unanimous Court, immigration decisions
were nonjusticiable political questions "conclusive upon the judiciary." 9
In several other key decisions that soon followed, the Supreme
Court made it clear that the plenary power doctrine would foreclose a
wide variety of constitutional claims. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 10
decided in 1892, the Supreme Court rejected the due process argument
of a Japanese intending immigrant. The immigration inspector had
found that Nishimura was likely to become a public charge and was
therefore excludable under the statute. Nishimura argued that the Con-
stitution entitled her to judicial review of that finding.1 ' The Court's
holding established that the political branches' plenary power over
immigration was not limited to determining the substantive categories
for admission and exclusion that had been at issue in the Chinese Exclusion
Case. In addition, plenary power embraced the procedures by which
admission to the United States was granted or denied.
The Court's 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States1
2
expanded the plenary power doctrine in yet another direction. At issue
was the government's authority to deport an immigrant already present
in the United States, rather than the authority to exclude an immigrant
seeking admission. Fong concerned an 1892 statute that extended the
ban on immigration by Chinese laborers for an additional ten years.
13
The same statute provided for the deportation of any Chinese laborers
who could not prove that they had entered the United States before
1892.14 The required proof was a certificate, which the government
would issue only on the "affidavit of at least one credible witness," 15
construed to denote a white witness. 16 In Fong Yue Ting, the Supreme
Court rejected the claim that this requirement violated the constitu-
tional guarantee of procedural due process.'
7
9. 130 U.S. at 606. The Court also rejected a subconstitutional argument that
the statute violated an 1880 treaty between the United States and China which
appeared to guarantee that Chinese laborers then already in the United States could
freely leave and return. See id. at 600.
10. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
11. Id. at 659-60.
12. 149 U.S. 698 (1893):
13. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25-26 (repealed 1943).
14. See 149 U.S. at 700 n.1 (citing Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25-
26 (repealed 1943)).
15. 149 U.S. at 701 n.1 (quoting regulations issued under Act of May 5, 1892, ch.
60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 26 (repealed 1943)).
16. See id. at 703, 731.
17. See id. at 713.
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B. The Erosion of the Plenary Power Doctrine
Notwithstanding these early decisions, the slow evolution over the past
one hundred years has been toward greater judicial involvement in
immigration matters. Particularly in the past twenty or thirty years, the
trend has accelerated.' 8 Judicial review has expanded to the point that
courts will, under some circumstances, hear constitutional challenges to
immigration decisions by the political branches. 19
The trend toward greater judicial scrutiny of constitutional chal-
lenges has taken place primarily along two dimensions. One concerns
procedural due process challenges, and the other relates to an immi-
grant's connection to the United States. A key to understanding both
dimensions is the Supreme Court's 1903 decision in Yamataya v. Fisher,
20
also known as the Japanese Immigrant Case. Yamataya had been in the
United States for four days when the government tried to deport her on
the statutory ground that she was likely to become a public charge. 2 1
The Supreme Court's decision established that immigrants enjoy
greater constitutional rights after they have "entered" the United States.
In the parlance, immigrants who have not entered may be "excluded";
those who have entered may be "deported." Yamataya announced the
courts' willingness to hear procedural due process challenges brought
by such deportable immigrants.
Yamataya has had significant impact in two respects. First, courts
since Yamataya have been more willing to hear procedural due process
challenges than claims that an immigrant has a substantive constitu-
tional right to enter the United States. 22 Second, and more pertinent to
placing interdiction into historical context, courts since Yamataya have
been more willing to hear constitutional claims when the immigrant has
developed some connection with the United States. A key (but not
exclusive) factor in assessing that "connection" is the immigrant's physi-
cal location when the government acts in an allegedly unlawful manner.
In common sense terms, the question has become: is the immigrant
"here" or "there"?
18. See articles cited supra note 7.
19. A similar evolution in judicial review has taken place on a subconstitutional
level, in cases involving judicial scrutiny of statutes, regulations, operations instruc-
tions, and their interpretation by agencies. I have written elsewhere about the rela-
tionship between the increase in judicial willingness to hear constitutional claims and
judicial willingness to hear subconstitutional challenges to the government's immi-
gration decisions. See Phantom Norms, supra note 7.
20. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
21. Id. at 94-96 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084).
22. This greater willingness to hear procedural due process challenges is dis-
cussed much more fully in Procedural Surrogates, supra note 7. Key precursors of this
aspect of Yamataya include the dissents in Fong Yue Ting. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S.
698, 763 (Fuller, CJ., dissenting); id. at 741-42 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 760
(Field, J., dissenting).
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C. Reasons for the Erosion of the Plenary Power Doctrine
A crucial factor behind the erosion of plenary power is the fundamental
ambivalence in the way our public law-and perhaps our society gener-
ally-treats immigrants. Outside the context of immigration decisions,
immigrants enjoy decidedly more legal hospitality. This more generous
attitude is evident in a line of cases that began with the Supreme Court's
1886 decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.23 Yick Wo invalidated, on equal pro-
tection grounds, the enforcement of a San Francisco municipal ordi-
nance in a manner which made it impossible for Chinese immigrants to
operate laundries. Yick Wo's modem progeny includes Graham v. Rich-
ardson,2 4 which struck down an Arizona residency requirement that
restricted immigrants' access to welfare programs. Similarly, Plyler v.
Doe 25 struck down a Texas statute that effectively barred the children of
undocumented aliens from attending public schools. And when immi-
grants are charged with crimes, even immigration-related ones, they
have constitutional protections that roughly track the basic principles of
the constitutional criminal procedure applicable to United States
citizens.2
6
To be sure, the Yick Wo line of cases has never stood for the propo-
sition that immigrants enjoy the same constitutional rights as citizens.
Some of these cases rest partially on the rationale that the states may not
encroach on the federal immigration power. Nonetheless, the Yick Wo
tradition is that courts should analyze immigrants' rights-if only
outside the immigration context itself-in a way that parallels their anal-
ysis of citizens' rights. Some of the decisions in the Vick Wo line of cases
in fact confer less generous treatment on immigrants than on citizens.
But at least these decisions do not disclaim any meaningful judicial
role-in contrast to the seminal plenary power cases.
For the political branches, and especially the executive branch, the
erosion of the plenary power doctrine represents a significant loss of
power to an increasingly active judiciary. In this historical context, the
Haitian interdiction policies that have been in effect since September
1981 take on a special significance.
23. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237
(1896), which held that an alien could invoke Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
before being imprisoned for being in the United States illegally.
24. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
25. 457 U.S. 202, 210-16 (1982). For more extensive discussion of Yick Wo and
its progeny, see Phantom Norms, supra note 7, at 565-67, 583-86; Procedural Surrogates,
supra note 7, at 1647-48, 1688-91.
26. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-75 (1973)
(Fourth Amendment); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976)
(Fourth Amendment); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1372-74 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Fifth Amendment); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 913-15 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Fifth Amendment).
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H. Interdiction and the Evolution of Immigration Law
Interdiction effectively restores much if not all of the immunity that the
plenary power doctrine originally established. It achieves this by
manipulating one of the dimensions of the expansion of judicial review
since Yamataya-the immigrant's connection with the United States.
This connection includes the physical connection that arises when an
immigrant arrives at the border, and in many cases, crosses it as well.
Interdiction transforms an asylum seeker who would otherwise be
"here" into an asylum seeker who is merely "there." In this way,
interdiction has fundamentally altered how courts view the key issues in
the Haitian Centers Council litigation.
A. Interdiction and the Issues in Haitian Centers Council
Haitian Centers Council is the second of two recent cases involving Haitian
asylum seekers. The first, Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker,27 started in
November 1991. The controversy at that point concerned not the Ken-
nebunkport Order, but rather an interdiction policy that had been in
effect since 1981.28 That policy was based on an agreement between the
United States and Haiti which allowed the United States government to
interdict Haitian flag vessels on the high seas. 29 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") individually screened the interdicted
Haitians to determine if each had a "credible fear of persecution."'3 0 At
first, screening took place on board United States Coast Guard cutters,
but it later occurred at the United States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba.
The "credible fear" test was intended as a preliminary screening
device, and was meant to be easier to meet than the asylum statute's
usual "well-founded fear of persecution" test for eligibility.3 1 About
27. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd, 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
28. See Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981); Exec. Order No.
12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). The United States temporarily suspended this
interdiction policy after a military coup overthrew Haitian President Jean Bertrand
Aristide on September 30, 1991, but interdiction resumed on November 18, 1991.
See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
29. See Agreement Effected By Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti,
T.I.A.S. No. 10,241.
30. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 (2d Cir.
1992).
31. An INS memorandum of November 22, 1991, defined "credible fear" as "an
apprehension or awareness, which appears to be truthful .. .of serious danger or
threat of harm." See id. at 1344. A different INS memorandum, dated March 1, 1991,
noted that "[t]his standard for transfer to the United States ... is considerably less
than the standard necessary to obtain asylum." See id. at 1344 n.14. See generally
Sarah Ignatius, Haitian Asylum-Seekers: Their Treatment as a Measure of the INS Asylum
Corps, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 119, 125-26 (1993). "Well-founded fear ofpersecution" is
an element of the definition of "refugee," set out in Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). Those who establish that they are
"refugees" may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General. Immi-
gration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
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thirty percent of interdicted Haitians demonstrated a "credible fear,"
were "screened in," and thus allowed to come to the United States for a
final decision on their asylum claims.3 2 The approximately seventy per-
cent who could not show a "credible fear" were "screened out" and
accordingly returned to Haiti.
On November 19, 1991, the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker liti-
gation was filed in the federal district court for the Southern District of
Florida. The plaintiffs brought constitutional and statutory challenges
to the procedures for screening the interdicted Haitians and repatriating
those who were "screened-out." Although the district court issued a
preliminary injunction that barred the government from repatriating
screened-out Haitians,33 the government eventually prevailed in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari on February 24, 1992.3
4
Then, on February 29, 1992, the INS announced that interdicted
Haitians who had tested HIV-positive would not be allowed to come to
the United States for a final asylum interview and decision.35 The statu-
tory basis for this policy was the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
Section 212(a)(1)(A)(I), which provides for the exclusion of any alien
"who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services) to have a communicable dis-
ease of public health significance." 36 Instead, their asylum claims would
be decided after an interview held at Guantinamo Bay. Several of the
screened-in HIV-positive Haitians requested legal assistance, but the
government declined to afford them access to volunteer counsel for
their asylum interview. The Haitian Centers Council litigation was filed on
March 17, 1992, to raise constitutional and statutory claims against
these restrictions.3 7 All of these claims would be stronger if the Haitians
had reached the United States instead of being interdicted.
32. See Ignatius, supra note 31, at 126.
33. Haitian Refugee Center, 789 F. Supp. at 1578-79.
34. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (1 1th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685
(IIth Cir. 1991); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.
1991). The government has consistently maintained that the Haitian Refugee Center
outcome precludes the Haitian Centers Council litigation, but the district court and Sec-
ond Circuit have rejected that argument. See Haitian Centers Council, 789 F. Supp. at
545-46; Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d 1326, 1334-38; Haitian Centers Council, 969
F.2d 1350, 1354-57. Because the Kennebunkport Order has mooted the issues
presented in Haitian Refugee Center, this article focuses on the Haitian Centers Council
litigation, but much of this article's analysis would apply to the issues in Haitian Refu-
gee Center as well.
35. See Memorandum from Grover J. Rees, General Counsel, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, to John Cummings, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
regarding Interviews of "Screened in" Persons Subject to Medical Exclusion (Feb.
29, 1992) (on file with the author and the Cornell International Law Journal).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(I) (Supp. 11 1990).
37. For more background on the Haitian Centers Council and Haitian Refugee Center
litigation, see Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1329-34; Haitian Centers Council, 789
F. Supp. at 542-43.
Cornell International Law Journal
One key constitutional claim that this group of Haitians asserts is a
Fifth Amendment due process right to be represented by counsel at no
expense to the government in connection with the final asylum determi-
nations at Guantfnamo Bay.3 8 From Yamataya and later cases, it is clear
that these interdicted Guantfinamo Bay detainees would have such a
right if they had both reached the border and entered the United States,
thus becoming "deportable" immigrants. 39 Indeed, one of the plain-
tiffs' arguments is that reaching Guantinamo Bay should be treated as
reaching United States soil for determining the extent of the Haitians'
legal rights.40 However, the INS bars access by volunteer attorneys to
asylum interviews at Guantinamo Bay. The district court granted,4 1 and
the Second Circuit affirmed, a preliminary injunction that continues to
bar the government from repatriating this "screened-in" group without
access to volunteer counsel.4 2 This group, including relatives, now
numbers about 250 and remains at Guantfinamo Bay today.43 It is not
clear that the Supreme Court will agree with the courts below that this
group, having never entered the United States, has a Fifth Amendment
due process right to counsel at no expense to the government.
On May 24, 1992, President Bush issued the "Kennebunkport
Order," revoking the 1981 policy of interdiction with screening. The
new policy provides for the interdiction and repatriation of all Haitians
leaving Haiti by boat with no procedures to determine if any are fleeing
38. See Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1339-46 (discussing "serious questions
going to the merits of the 'screened in' plaintiffs' fifth amendment claims"). Volun-
teer counsel and Haitian refugee organizations also asserted First Amendment rights
to access to their clients. See id. at 1333. Similar claims had been raised and rejected
in the 11th Circuit litigation. See Haitian Refugee Center, 953 F.2d at 1511-15 (First
Amendment); Haitian Refugee Center, 789 F. Supp. at 1574-75 (Fifth Amendment).
39. See Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1341 n.8; see also Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957, 967 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985);
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990); Montilla v.
INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1991).
40. See Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1341-44; Haitian Centers Council, 789 F.
Supp. at 547 (Guantinamo Naval Base "is subject to United States jurisdiction").
41. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 92-CIV-1258, 1992 WL 155853,
at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992).
42. See 969 F.2d at 1338-47. The district court issued the preliminary injunction
on April 6, 1992. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 92-CIV-1258, 1992
WL 155853 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992). On April 22, the Supreme Court stayed the
preliminary injunction while the government appealed it to the Second Circuit.
McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1714 (1992). Between April 22
and the Second Circuit's order affirming the preliminary injunction onJune 10, 1992,
the government repatriated a significant number of the HIV-positive Haitians who
had been the intended beneficiaries of the preliminary injunction. See Susan Beck,
Cast Away, AM. LAw., Oct. 1992, at 58.
The question of a Fifth Amendment due process right of access to volunteer coun-
sel is not now before the Supreme Court, but the government has filed a petition for
certiorari that includes as one of the questions presented: "Do aliens outside United
States have rights under Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in connection with
their attempts to enter this country?" 61 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1992).
43. See Haitian Centers Council, 789 F. Supp. at 544-45.
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persecution.4 4 The Kennebunkport Order did not mention Haiti specif-
ically, but it was released to the news media with a White House state-
ment that the order "will permit the U.S. Coast Guard to begin
returning Haitians picked up at sea directly to Haiti." 45 According to
the government, Haitians who fear persecution and seek safe haven in
the United States are to apply for refugee status at the United States
Embassy in Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital.
46
On May 29, the plaintiffs in Haitian Centers Council asked the district
court to issue a temporary restraining order against the new interdiction
policy. The district court declined to do so, but on July 29, 1992, the
Second Circuit reversed on the ground that INA Section 243(h) protects
the interdicted Haitians from being repatriated without some determi-
nation as to possible refugee status.47 Section 243(h)(1) provides for
"nonrefoulement"-that the "Attorney General shall not deport or return
any alien" to the country from which he fled if "such alien's life or free-
dom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."48 The Supreme Court granted a stay of the Second Circuit order
on August 1, 1992, 4 9 and granted the government's petition for certio-
rari on October 5, 1992.
Another constitutional issue in Haitian Centers Council is whether any
special interdiction policy directed at Haitians violates equal protection
because the government is discriminating on the basis of race. This
claim was part of both the original Haitian Centers Council case concerning
access to volunteer counsel50 and the amended case directed against the
Kennebunkport Order.51 If the interdicted Haitians had reached the
border, had entered the United States, and were being detained here, it
is an open question whether they would succeed with such a claim. The
Supreme Court avoided a similar equal protection question in Jean v.
Nelson,5 2 a 1985 decision that interpreted the asylum statute and regula-
tions to bar race and national origin discrimination as a subconstitu-
tional matter. In spite of this uncertainty, it is clear that the Haitians'
44. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). Section 2(c)(3) of the
order provides that "the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide
that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his consent." (emphasis
added.)
45. See Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1353.
46. Brief for the Petitioners at 7, 57.
47. See 969 F.2d at 1357-61.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
49. 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (Aug. 1, 1992).
50. See Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1336.
51. See id. at 1354. This issue is not within the Supreme Court's grant of certio-
rari, but it remains in the litigation. See Brief of The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Transafrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus
as Amici Curiae in Respondents, which addresses this issue, and which plaintiffs have
incorporated by reference into their brief. See Brief for Respondents at 11.
52. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). For more extensive discussion of Jean, see Phantom
Nornn, supra note 7, at 587-93; Procedural Surrogates, supra note 7, at 1698-99.
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entry into and physical presence in the United States would make this
equal protection claim stronger than the same claim brought by Haitians
with less physical connection to the United States.
So far, I have maintained that the Haitians' procedural due process
and equal protection claims would be stronger if, instead of being inter-
dicted, they had reached our shores and entered the United States. But
what if they had merely reached the border, where they either were
apprehended by government officials or voluntarily presented them-
selves to apply for asylum? Let us assume, in other words, that these
Haitians did not manage to cross the border into the United States.
Having not "entered," they would be subject to "exclusion" rather than
"deportation."
Interdiction undermines the constitutional and statutory claims of
these hypothetical "excludable" Haitians as well. To be sure, aliens in
exclusion generally enjoy less extensive rights, at both constitutional
and statutory levels, than aliens in deportation. However, the formal
line between exclusion and deportation is much less dispositive of
would-be immigrants' rights than it once was.53 Prominent decisions
have analyzed the rights of asylum seekers who were being detained in
the United States without placing much weight on whether they were in
exclusion or deportation.54 More practically and more importantly,
many of those who reach the border will manage to evade immigration
authorities and enter the United States in fact. Interdiction ensures that
Haitian asylum seekers will not enter, thus depriving them of the rise in
legal stature that comes with being subject to deportation rather than
exclusion.
Under the current grant of certiorari in Haitian Centers Council, the
central issue of substantive refugee law is what appears to be a question
of statutory interpretation: whether Section 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act5 5 applies to Haitians who are interdicted pursuant
to the Kennebunkport Order.5 6 The government argues that Section
243(h) does not apply extraterritorially, and thus does not apply to
aliens who have not reached the United States border.5 7 The govern-
ment also argues that Section 243(h) constrains only the Attorney Gen-
eral, not the Coast Guard.58 Of course, it is only because of interdiction
53. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982). For a more extensive
discussion of Plasencia, see Procedural Surrogates, supra note 7, at 1652-56.
54. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (excludable Haitian asylum
seekers).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
56. The district court in Haitian Refugee Center declined to grant a preliminary
injunction on this basis, see Haitian Refugee Center, 789 F. Supp. at 1575, and the
Eleventh Circuit concurred, see 953 F.2d at 1506, 1510. Accord, Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1403-04 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd ol other
grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
57. Brief for the Petitioners at 29-36.
58. Id. at 29.
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that the government can make these arguments. 59
Although this issue has a subconstitutional appearance, it has sev-
eral constitutional aspects. First, the government urges a broad inter-
pretation of presidential power over immigration to protect United
States sovereignty "in this sensitive area of military operations and for-
eign policy."'60 According to the government, this executive power-a
constitutional norm-should persuade the Court to interpret Section
243(h) not to apply extraterritorially. 6 t A second argument, closely
related to the first, is that even if executive power does not suggest such
a general limitation on Section 243(h), in this particular context it
trumps the interdicted Haitians' rights under Section 243(h). 62 While
59. A similar analysis would apply to another subconstitutional issue in the
Supreme Court: whether the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act should be interpreted to preclude judicial review. See id. at 13-18.
60. Id. at 13. See also id. at 56-57 (injunctive relief against Kennebunkport Order
would "impede the flexibility the President requires to address the migrant problem
within the broader context of the sensitive and fluid situation affecting Haiti gener-
ally, which is the subject of ongoing diplomatic and economic measures"); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari ("equitable principles foreclose an award of injunctive relief to
aliens outside the United States that bars implementation of the President's direc-
tives in this sensitive area of military operations and foreign policy"), excerpted in 69
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1164 (1992).
61. See Brief for the Petitioners at 28 ("In the absence of a clear statement, an Act
of Congress should not be construed to interfere with that fundamental attribute of
sovereignty by barring measures undertaken by the President, pursuant to express
statutory authorization, to prevent illegal entry of aliens."). For a fuller discussion of
the influence of constitutional norms on interpretation of immigration statutes, see
Phantom Norms, supra note 7.
62. The Second Circuit rejected this argument. See Haitian Centers Council, 969
F.2d at 1366. It also rejected the "undercurrent in the government's brief to the
effect that this case presents a 'political question' which is beyond the scope ofjudi-
cial decisionmaking." Id. at 1367. The government's argument that the Immigration
and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act preclude judicial review is
similarly based on a broad interpretation of discretionary presidential power in immi-
gration matters. See Brief for the Petitioners at 14.
The government also argues that broad presidential power in immigration matters
should also inform the Court's reading of Article 33.1 of the UN Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176, incorporated by
reference in Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6225. See Brief for the Petitioners at 36-37. Article 33.1 provides: "No Con-
tracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion."
In Haitian Centers Council, the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari does not include
the question whether article 33.1 applies to the interdicted Haitians. The district
court had found that the UN Protocol was not self-executing, that it therefore had the
force of law in United States courts only to the extent that it had been implemented
through legislation, and that the government's nonrefoulement obligations would
thus be determined solely with reference to Section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 92-CIV-1258, 1992 WL
155853, at * I 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir.
1982) as controlling precedent), discussed in Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1353.
The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Haitian Refugee Center, 949 F.2d
at 1110.
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both of these arguments are directed at the statute, they rely on a consti-
tutional norm of broad presidential power over immigration to protect
United States sovereignty. And, as I have explained, any constitutional
analysis of immigrants' rights is fundamentally altered when, due to
interdiction, Haitian asylum seekers are kept outside the United States.
B. Interdiction and Plenary Power: Parallels in Rhetoric
The government is using interdiction to skew the inquiry into an immi-
grant's physical connection to the United States, thus effectively restor-
ing much of the plenary power doctrine as it might have once applied to
these facts. 63 Indeed, there are striking parallels between the rhetoric in
the seminal plenary power cases and the government's brief in Haitian
Centers Council. In both contexts, the government characterized ques-
tions of immigration law and policy as matters of "national security"
beyond the appropriate reach of judicial review.
For example, the Court's opinion in Fong Yue Ting stated that "[t]he
United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by
the constitution with the entire control of international relations, and
with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control,
and to make it effective."' 4 Similar rhetoric is evident in the district
court opinion in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey.65 This 1985 deci-
sion upheld the pre-May 1992 policy of interdiction with screening.
Relying primarily on the Chinese Exclusion Case and another key plenary
power case,66 Gracey found that "the President's power to suspend the
entry of illegal aliens from the high seas by interdiction has a clear con-
stitutional basis."' 67 Similarly, the government's brief in Haitian Centers
Council relies on the seminal plenary power doctrine cases in emphasiz-
ing the need to safeguard the nation's sovereignty, 68 arguing that "[b]y
enjoining the President's action, the court of appeals has interfered
directly with the operation of military vessels under his command and
upset the delicate balance of diplomatic and other measures he insti-
63. I am not necessarily suggesting that the Bush Administration was fully aware
of immigration law history when it issued the Kennebunkport Order. My point is
more limited, simply that the policy is intended to have the effect that I am
describing.
64. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893), discussed in text
accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
65. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
66. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
67. 600 F. Supp. at 1400.
68. See Brief for the Petitioners at 28, 36-37. The government's attorney opened
oral argument before the Supreme Court by saying that the case primarily concerns
the President's emergency powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act to pre-
vent a mass migration of aliens to the United States. In support, she later cited a
leading plenary power case, United States ev rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950), stating that "[t]he President must be allowed to construe his authority to
protect U.S. sovereignty and save lives." See Suprenze Court Hears Argument in Haitian
Refugee Case, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 277, 279 (1993).
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tuted to resolve the broader crisis .... ,,69 The government's brief also
argues that judicial scrutiny will "undermine the ability of this Nation to
speak with one voice, through the President" on the question of the
United States' obligations regarding refugees.
70
C. Haitian Centers Council: Arguing About Interdiction
Within this historical context of the government's efforts to invoke ple-
nary power, the parties' arguments about interdiction in Haitian Centers
Council merit examination.7 t Not surprisingly, the government's brief
characterizes the issue as whether Section 243(h) applies extraterritori-
ally. 72 This approach assigns no special significance to interdiction. It
assumes that a Haitian whom the United States Coast Guard interdicts
in international waters is simply an alien who is outside the United
States. Thus, the interdicted Haitian occupies a constitutional and statu-
tory position that is arguably no better than if he or she had applied for
a visa in Port-au-Prince. 73 According to the government, the plaintiffs
in Haitian Centers Council are arguing that Section 243(h) "confers a free-
standing right upon aliens anywhere in the world."
74
More surprisingly, the plaintiff-respondents' brief partially adopts
the government's view that the issue is whether Section 243(h) applies
extraterritorially. A substantial part of the brief argues for the general
proposition that Section 243(h) applies extraterritorially. 7 5 To be sure,
the plaintiffs argue in several places that interdiction merits special
treatment, and that it uniquely undermines the government's argument
against extraterritorial application of Section 243(h). However, these
points emerge only on the periphery of the plaintiffs' argument. For
example, the plaintiffs point out that "the executive action at issue has
itself extended the statute extraterritorially," but they do so in response
69. Brief for the Petitioners at 10. See also id. at 13 (referring to interdiction as
part of "this sensitive area of military operations").
70. Id. at 57.
71. Because the central substantive issue currently before the Court is the statu-
tory issue of the application of Section 243(h), I will focus on the arguments about
interdiction in that context, but my comments also apply to the other constitutional
and statutory issues in the case.
72. See Brief for the Petitioners at 27 ("Section 1253(h) has no application to
aliens outside the United States.").
73. Id. at 36. See also id. at 55 (characterizing Second Circuit as having construed
Section 243(h) "to confer a free-standing right of non-patriation on aliens anywhere
in the world"). This argument is consistent with the government's position in the
Second Circuit. See, e.g., 969 F.2d at 1341 ("The appellants argue that since the
detained Haitians have not 'entered' the United States ... they are not entitled to any
protections under the due process clause.").
74. This is consistent with the district court's analysis in Gracey. See Haitian Refu-
gee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1404 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding plaintiffs
cannot obtain relief under statute because they never reached United States), aff'd on
other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
75. See Brief for Respondents at 8-39. See also id. at 17 (Section 243(h) is "avail-
able to 'any alien' without geographic limitation"); id. at 21 (" 'Refouler' is a term of
art, but one that is not limited to a state's territory.").
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to the government's reliance on a general presumption against extrater-
ritorial application of statutes.
7 6
A different and stronger plaintiffs' argument would be that it is
immaterial whether Section 243(h) has general extraterritorial applica-
tion, to a Haitian in Port-au-Prince, for example. Instead, a narrower
ground for deciding the case in the plaintiffs' favor is that interdiction
merits unique treatment in any constitutional or subconstitutional analy-
sis of "extraterritoriality." The reason is precisely because interdiction
skews the results of a court's constitutional and statutory inquiry into an
immigrant's connection to the United States. A court should disregard
the interdiction, and instead adopt the constitutional or statutory analy-
sis that would apply but for the interdiction. A court would thus ask what
constitutional and statutory rights interdicted Haitians would enjoy if
they had reached South Florida and applied for asylum while in exclu-
sion or deportation proceedings.
7 7
The distinction is significant and merits more attention in both
argument and analysis. Take, for example, the issue of whether inter-
dicted, screened-in Haitians detained at Guantfnamo Bay may invoke
due process protections under the Fifth Amendment. If the Court
accepts the government's framing of the issue, the plaintiffs can win only
if any immigrants may invoke Fifth Amendment due process rights at
Guantinamo Bay. But alternatively, the Court could treat interdiction
as a special case of extraterritoriality. In particular it could neutralize
the effect of interdiction on constitutional and statutory analysis. The
Court could hold that persons who are at Guantinamo Bay only because
they were interdicted en route to the United States are entitled to invoke
the Fifth Amendment, even if other immigrants at Guant~namo Bay may
not.
In drawing this distinction, I do not wish to second-guess the plain-
tiffs' tactical choices. There are good reasons for this part of their brief
to focus on the general question of Section 243(h)'s extraterritorial
application. In particular, this was the approach of the Second Circuit
decision that the Supreme Court is now reviewing. There, as in the
plaintiffs' brief, the Second Circuit was somewhat ambivalent in framing
the issue. The Second Circuit did point to the special character of
interdiction, writing: "[a]bsent proactive government intervention of the
sort presented here, § 243(h)(1)'s ban on 'return' of aliens to their per-
secutors could not be invoked by persons located outside the borders of
76. Id. at 34. See also id. at 9 ("No government has ever before taken to the high
seas to intercept fleeing refugees and return them, forcibly and without process, to
their persecutors."); id. at 34 n.62:
Similarly, only petitioners' attempts to circumvent the constraint of § 243(h),
through interdiction on the high seas, results in the extraterritorial reach of
the statute. Respondents know of no case in which the presumption, which
petitioners' [sic] manipulate in an attempt to avoid judicial review, has been
applied to permit the executive to act extraterritorially, where a statute would
preclude such conduct domestically.
77. See supra notes 38-62 and accompanying text.
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the United States." 78 In the end, however, the Second Circuit spoke to
the general extraterritoriality question: "the district court erred in con-
cluding that § 243(h)(1) does not apply to aliens outside the United
States." 79 The plaintiffs' brief may strike the optimum tactical balance.
It presents strong arguments both that Section 243(h) applies extraterri-
torially as a general matter, and that Section 243(h) applies to these Hai-
tians merely because they were interdicted, without calling much
attention to the distinction between them. But for purposes of analysis,
and quite possibly future tactics as well, the distinction is important and
deserves further elaboration.
M. Precedent for Treating Interdiction as Unique
A. Affirmative Acts of the United States Government
The broad analytical basis for treating interdiction as unique is the idea
that the government's affirmative acts may expand the territorial scope
of its constitutional and statutory obligations. A leading example is the
Second Circuit's 1958 decision in United States ex rel. Paktorovics v.
Murff.80 The case involved a Hungarian refugee who had been allowed
into the United States in 1956 under the Attorney General's "parole"
authority.8 1 A would-be immigrant who is granted "parole" is physi-
cally allowed into the United States but is formally regarded as not hav-
ing "entered," and thus enjoys no more rights than an excludable
would-be immigrant.8 2 After Paktorovics had been in the United States
for about eight months, the government revoked his parole on the
ground that he had allegedly concealed aspects of his prior membership
in the Communist Party. The Second Circuit found that the decision to
revoke parole was within the Attorney General's delegated authority.
The court reasoned, however, that because Paktorovics had been
"invited here pursuant to the announced foreign policy of the United
78. 969 F.2d at 1358-59.
79. Id. at 1360. See also id. at 1366 ("§ 243(h)(1) of the INA applies to all aliens,
no matter where found"). The mixing of approaches-treating interdiction specially,
while addressing the extraterritorial application of Section 243(h) as a general mat-
ter-is most evident in the following sentence from the Second Circuit's opinion:
Since the plain language of § 243(h) demonstrates that what is important is
the place 'to' which, not 'from' which, the refugee is returned, and since
§ 243(h)(1) by its terms (a) applies to all 'aliens' regardless of their location,
and (b) prohibits their 'return... to a country' where they would likely be
persecuted, we conclude that the executive's action of reaching out into inter-
national waters, intercepting Haitian refugees, and returning them without
determining whether the return is to their persecutors, violates § 243(h)(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Id. at 1361. See also Brief for Respondents at 7-8 (summarizing Second Circuit's
reasoning).
80. 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
81. At that time, the Attorney General's parole authority under Section 212(d)(5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988), was the principal
means for accommodating refugees seeking admission to the United States.
, 82. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958).
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States," 8 3 he was entitled to a hearing even though he had merely been
paroled into the United States.8 4 Casting its decision as a reading of the
parole statute, the court expressed "serious doubt" as to the statute's
constitutionality as a procedural due process matter if it were construed
otherwise.
8 5
Most recently, similar reasoning is evident in the Haitian Centers
Council preliminary injunction that bars repatriation of the screened-in
Haitians detained at Guantinamo Bay unless they are provided access to
volunteer counsel.8 6 In upholding this preliminary injunction, the Sec-
ond Circuit cited Paktorovics and found-on an explicitly constitutional
level-that the "affirmative actions" by the government "established a
reasonable expectation by the 'screened in' plaintiffs in not being
wrongly repatriated."'8 7 The court added: "we believe this expectation
to be protected by the due process clause."8 8 The general reasoning
pattern that emerges from decisions like Paktorovics and the right to
counsel preliminary injunction in Haitian Centers Council is that the gov-
ernment's affirmative acts, including interdiction in international waters,
may enhance the legal rights of would-be immigrants.
B. The "Functional Equivalent of the Border"
Given the general proposition that the government's affirmative acts
may expand the territorial scope of its obligations, the concept of the
"functional equivalent of the border," borrowed from criminal proce-
dure, lends specific support for treating interdiction separately. The
government is subject to fewer Fourth Amendment constraints when
administering the border by, for example, searching individuals and
vehicles to check for undocumented aliens and prohibited or dutiable
items.8 9 This greater freedom of action applies not only at the physical
border, but also at other locations where the government performs bor-
der-related tasks. As the Supreme Court stated in its 1973 decision in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,90 "[w]hatever the permissible scope of
intrusiveness of a routine border search might be, searches of this kind
may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but
at its functional equivalents as well." 9 '
83. 260 F.2d at 614.
84. Id. at 612.
85. In this regard, Paktorovics may be a "phantom norm" decision of the sort ana-
lyzed in Phantom Norms, supra note 7.
86. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
87. 969 F.2d at 1345. The court also cited Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 877 (2d
Cir. 1983).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621-22 (1977).
90. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
91. Id. at 272. The Court continued:
For example, searches at a point marking the confluence of two or more
roads that extend from the border, might be functional equivalents of border
searches. For another example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an
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While Almeida-Sanchez discussed the possibility of finding a "func-
tional equivalent of the border" inside the United States, other decisions
have emphasized the flexibility of the concept. One court noted, "the
functional equivalent of the border need bear no particular time or
space relationship to the actual border."9 2 Some decisions have applied
the concept to searches that take place offshore but within the "territo-
rial sea" of the United States, which now extends twelve nautical miles
from shore.93 Other decisions have applied the "functional equivalent
of the border" concept to searches that take place beyond territorial
waters and on the part of the "high seas" that is termed the "contiguous
zone" or "customs waters," which extend from twelve to twenty-four
nautical miles from shore.
94
Other cases have expanded the "customs waters" concept even fur-
ther to include "constructive customs waters," which can lie on the high
airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City
would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.
Id. at 272-73. Courts have applied the concept in varying ways. See, e.g., United
States v. Alvarez-Gonzales, 542 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965-67 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916
(1975). See generally Paul S. Rosenzweig, Note, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sov-
ereignty, and the Fourth Amendment, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1119 (1985); Adrienne Rivers,
Note, Border Zone Search Law: The Search for a Definition of Functional Equivalents of the
Border, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 261 (1981).
92. United States v. Bareno-Burgos, 739 F. Supp. 772, 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). See
also United States v. Hill, 939 F.2d 934, 936 (11 th Cir. 1991) ("For the purpose of
suspicionless Customs searches, the border is elastic.").
93. See, e.g., United States v. Dobson, 781 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1364 (9th Cir. 1976). On the definition of"territo-
rial sea," see art. 1, Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1606 (1964) ("The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its
land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as
the territorial sea."). Until 1988, the United States viewed its territorial waters as
extending three nautical miles from shore. That year, it declared that its territorial
waters extend twelve nautical miles from shore. See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed.
Reg. 777 (1988). See generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 937, 951-52 (1991).
94. See United States v. Hidalgo-Gato, 703 F.2d 1267, 1270-73 (1 1th Cir. 1983);
United States v. MacPherson, 664 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1098 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d
661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). See also 46 U.S.C. § 1903
(c) (1988) ("a 'vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States' includes-.., a
vessel located within the customs waters of the United States"). On the definition of
"contiguous zone," art. 24, Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612-13 (1964), provides: "In a zone of the high seas
contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary
to ... [p]revent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regula-
tions within its territory or territorial sea ...." The same convention further pro-
vides: "The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id. The term "high seas"
for transit purposes (as opposed to seabed uses, for example) thus encompasses the
"contiguous zone." See United States v. Cilley, 785 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1065 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); art. 1,
Convention of the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962) ("The term 'high seas' means all
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of
a State."). See generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 93, at 965-66.
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seas beyond the contiguous zone.95 Under this line of analysis, a for-
eign vessel is deemed to be within the "constructive customs waters" of
the United States, if the United States and the vessel's country of regis-
try have entered into a "treaty or other arrangement" that allows United
States authorities to board and search the vessel.96 While the cases in
this last group do not expressly use the "functional equivalent of the
border" formula, the underlying idea is the same-the government can
exercise border control in a variety of locations, ranging from onshore
to out beyond the contiguous zone.
Typically, the government uses the functional equivalent concept to
free itself of constitutional and statutory constraints on search and
seizure. Indeed, if the United States government were to argue that the
concept of "constructive customs waters" authorizes a customs search of
Haitian flag vessels, it would want to rely on an agreement with Haiti
permitting interdiction for customs purposes. That agreement could be
an ad hoc arrangement to search individual vessels, 9 7 or it could be a
treaty or other standing arrangement, such as the 1981 United States-
Haiti interdiction agreement to control "illegal migration."9 8 Such
arrangements would extend out into international waters the govern-
ment's freedom to perform border functions.
In Haitian Centers Council, however, the "functional equivalent of the
border" concept would have the opposite result, one that the govern-
ment is trying to avoid. Applying the concept would have the effect of
restoring many constitutional and statutory rights to the interdicted Hai-
tians. In spite of the difference in effect, both the customs and immigra-
tion situations illustrate how the "border" is not a fixed location, but
rather wherever the government performs border functions, which cer-
tainly include control of entry.99
Under this analysis, the Haitians interdicted by the Coast Guard
have already reached the functional equivalent of the United States bor-
der, and thus should be treated as having reached the border for pur-
poses of seeking nonrefoulement. They should be permitted to rely on
the protections of Section 243(h), regardless of whether Section 243(h)
95. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 251 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 753 (1991); United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 490 (1st Cir. 1988); United
States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Alomia-Riascos,
825 F.2d 769, 770-71 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Molinares Charris, 822 F.2d
1213, 1216-17 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir.
1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 935-36 (11 th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1548-49 (1Ith Cir. 1985); United States v.
Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (11 th Cir. 1985).
96. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1988).
97. See decisions cited supra note 95.
98. See Agreement Effected By Exchange of Notes, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti,
T.I.A.S. No. 10,241, supra note 29.
99. Cf Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocu-
mented Workers Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955, 1006-19 (discussing
how imposition of sanctions on employers of undocumented workers introduces bor-
der control functions into the employment relationship).
Vol 26
1993 Interdiction and Immigrants' Rights
has general extraterritorial application. Somewhat surprisingly, this
argument has received little attention in the recent Haitian cases. The
only published decision that mentions it is the Eleventh Circuit opinion
in the related Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker litigation,100 where the
court rejected the argument almost summarily. 10
C. The Verdugo-Urquidez Problem
A question that naturally arises is whether my suggested treatment of
interdiction is consistent with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,10 2 a 1990
Supreme Court decision that apparently limited the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution. Verdugo involved warrantless searches
by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency of a Mexican national's
residences in Mexico. The United States government sought to intro-
duce the fruits of those searches into evidence in a federal criminal trial
in the United States. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of
property that is located in a foreign country and owned by a nonresident
alien who has no voluntary attachment to the United States.
10 3
On balance, Verdugo has little, if any, effect on my suggested treat-
ment of interdiction. First, the majority was careful to tie its reasoning
to the language of the Fourth Amendment-certainly not a Court favor-
ite in recent years-and in particular to the warrant clause. The Verdugo
majority relied heavily on the Fourth Amendment's reference to "the
people," contrasting it to the broader language and presumably broader
scope of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.104 Second, there is a more
fundamental difference that distinguishes the search in Verdugo from the
Haitian interdiction.
Although the warrantless searches in Verdugo were acts of the United
States government, the government did not cause the location of those
acts to be outside the United States. The government did not actively
prevent Verdugo from reaching the United States and the protections
that the Constitution offers to those who reach or cross the border.
Verdugo remained outside the United States voluntarily, and as long as
he did so, he remained beyond the Fourth Amendment's protections. In
this respect, he was much more like a Haitian who unsuccessfully applies
100. 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
101. The discussion reads as follows:
Plaintiffs argue that the language of § 1158(a) should be read to include a
land border or port of entry or its functional equivalent. Plaintiffs contend
that because the United States government is reaching out into the Carib-
bean to interdict them, it is effectively extending the borders to that extent.
We decline to interpret the statute this broadly. The plain language of the
statute is unambiguous and limits the application of the provision to aliens
within the United States or at United States' borders or ports of entry.
Id. at 1510 (citing Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1404
(D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
102. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
103. Id. at 264-75.
104. Id. at 264-68.
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for a visa in Port-au-Prince and then claims that he or she has been
denied procedural due process. That Haitian is "outside" the United
States under any reasonable characterization of the facts, and it requires
a truly "extraterritorial" application of the Constitution to offer him
protection under the Due Process Clause. In contrast, the interdicted
Haitian would be in the United States, or at least at the border, but for
the government's affirmative act of interdiction. To alter the Verdugo
facts to approximate interdiction, we would need to imagine that the
United States government caused property to be moved out of the
United States, searched the property without a warrant, and then
claimed that the Fourth Amendment did not apply.
There is precedent like Verdugo for subconstitutional extraterritori-
ality, and it merits an analogous analysis. In 1991, the Supreme Court
held in EEOC v. Arabian-American Oil Co. 105 that Title VII as it read at that
time was not applicable to the employment practices of United States
employers who employed United States citizens abroad. In that case, as
in Verdugo, extraterritoriality was not a state of affairs manufactured by
the United States government. An entirely different analysis would have
been necessary, if the United States government had forcibly relocated
the employer to an overseas location, and then claimed that it had no
duty to follow its statutory mandate under Title VII.
IV. Interdiction and the Problem of "Entry"
In Haitian Centers Council, the Supreme Court can treat interdiction in any
of several ways. It could, as I have suggested, treat interdiction as dis-
tinct from the general question of extraterritoriality. Or, the Court
might view the issue as simply whether Section 243(h) applies extraterri-
torially. While the latter seems much more favorable to the govern-
ment, it contains a paradox.
In parts II and III of this article, I explained how the government's
interdiction policy can enhance its immunity from judicial review. The
paradox is that interdiction also increases the government's exposure to
judicial review; it does so by strengthening what would otherwise be the
Achilles' heel of the plaintiffs' position in Haitian Centers Council. This
most fundamental problem with the plaintiffs' Supreme Court brief is
the assertion that "[t]his is not a case about entry," 10 6 but rather about
the right not to be returned to Haiti. Those who seek nonrefoulement
typically do so at the border or after having entered the United States.
For them, any claim to nonrefoulement is about entry in some signifi-
cant respects. To grant them nonrefoulement in turn opens the door to
their release from detention, to work authorization, and to other meas-
105. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
106. Brief for Respondents at 8. The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion.
See 969 F.2d 1326, at 1366 ("The President's power to regulate 'entry' into the
United States is not questioned on this appeal.").
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ures that are aspects of durable asylum and thus begin to approach de
facto entry.
The plaintiffs' reluctance to acquiesce in the government's "entry"
characterization is understandable, given the long history of judicial
reluctance to review the political branches' substantive admission deci-
sions. This background accounts, for example, for the Tenth Circuit's
surreal order in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson.10 7 That case involved a
Marielito Cuban detainee who sought release on parole, claiming that
indefinite detention would violate his rights under the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments. The court ordered his release, but in an effort to cast the
order as anything other than admission to the United States, the court
noted that release was not necessarily release within the United
States.108
Reno v. Flores,I 09 recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court, is another case in which active judicial involvement can have a
profound impact on who enjoys de facto entry into the United States,
notwithstanding the efforts of immigrants' advocates to minimize those
implications. Flores was a class action challenging INS policies regarding
detention of minor children in deportation proceedings. To the extent
that success in the litigation would have led to the children's release,
even if temporary, the consequences of such a decision included various
forms of de facto entry into the United States."Il 0 These concerns are
central to the plenary power doctrine, on which the Court majority
relied to reject the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments."'
A recent development in Haitian Centers Council reflects similar con-
cerns about judicial intervention in "entry" decisions. On March 26,
1993, JudgeJohnson ordered the government to provide adequate med-
ical treatment to the most seriously ill of the HIV-positive Haitians
detained at Guantinamo Bay. Conceding that adequate medical care
was unavailable at Guantinamo Bay, the government responded to the
judge's order by paroling thirty-six seriously ill detainees into the
United States for treatment. What is noteworthy but unsurprising is that
Judge Johnson drafted the order to avoid ordering "entry" into the
United States, in conformity with the general pattern of judicial self-
restraint on entry questions. Instead, the court ordered only that the
government either provide medical care at Guantinamo Bay or "medi-
cally evacuate such class members to a place (except Haiti) where such
107. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
108. Id. at 1390. For discussions of Rodriguez-Fernandez, see Phantom Norms, supra
note 7, at 593-94; Procedural Surrogates, supra note 7, at 1666-69.
109. 61 U.S.L.W. 4237 (Mar. 23, 1992), rev " Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1991) (en banc).
110. For a discussion of the lower court opinions in Flores, see Procedural Surrogates,
supra note 7, at 1672-73.
111. The Court set forth this reasoning in rejecting the plaintiffs' "substantive due
process" argument. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4240-4 1. It then rejected the plaintiffs' "proce-
dural due process" argument, reasoning that it merely recast the "substantive due
process" argument in procedural terms. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4242.
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medical care is available."'1 12
While the government's interdiction policy can enhance its immu-
nity from judicial review, paradoxically it also strengthens the plaintiffs'
argument that Haitian Centers Council is not a case about entry.'1 t
Interdiction does this-and thus seriously weakens the government's
case-by creating a physical gap between two United States "borders."
One border is the functional equivalent-the place where the govern-
ment first performs the border function of controlling entry. Interdic-
tion effectively moves this functional border outward into international
waters. The second "border" is of a different sort-the place where
border functions end, and where we can begin to speak of Haitians
"entering" American society. This remains at or near the physical, terri-
torial border, which for the vast majority of Haitians is the South Florida
coast.
The gap that interdiction creates between these "borders" mini-
mizes the likelihood that application of constitutional and statutory pro-
tections to immigrants by virtue of interdiction will lead to
consequences that amount to de facto entry. Because of this gap
between "borders," the plaintiffs accurately dissociate nonrefoulement
from entry when they argue that "[t]he Second Circuit's order does not
require petitioners to admit any Haitians to this country; nor does it bar
Haitians from sailing to third countries, from being brought to Guanti-
namo naval base, or even from being interdicted, so long as bona fide
refugees are not returned."'1 14 When asylum seekers are interdicted, a
ruling that they enjoy constitutional and statutory rights, whether under
the Fifth Amendment or under Section 243(h), still leaves the govern-
ment with these and other options. These options are always technically
available to the government, but they are difficult to use in practice with
respect to asylum seekers who are already at the border or in the United
States.
The paradox, then, is that interdiction has two legal effects that
tend to neutralize each other. On the one hand, interdiction helps the
government to minimize its constitutional and statutory obligations to
Haitian asylum seekers. On the other hand, interdiction undermines the
government's argument that the courts, by imposing those same obliga-
tions, would exceed their traditional role in immigration matters.
This paradox contains an important lesson: even if interdiction
could be interpreted to allow the government to avoid its constitutional
and statutory obligations, there is no good reason to do so. Some con-
trol over the influx of asylum seekers, including some forms of interdic-
tion, can be exercised in conformity with the dictates of the United
112. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, 92 CV 1258, 1993 WL 105468, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). See also Government to Parole 36 Haitians Infected With AIDS Virus, 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES 454 (1993);Judge Orders Adequate Medical Treatment for HIV Hai-
tians, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 414 (1993).
113. Brief for the Petitioners at 28 (referring to "illegal entry of aliens").
114. Brief for Respondents at 9.
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States Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Refu-
gee Convention. The end of total interdiction need not signal the
beginning of open borders or loss of control over the influx of asylum
seekers. The fundamental problem with the Kennebunkport Order is
that it prevents rational discourse about what policies might be fair, rea-
sonable, and constitutional.

